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I.  Abstract 
This paper reviews the application of national antitrust law and the implementation of the European 
Union’s telecommunications directives to the markets in the United Kingdom, against the declared 
policy objective of raising national competitiveness. It illustrates the complexity of the systems that 
have been created over three decades, with complex and interlocking regulatory, self-regulatory, 
judicial and appellate bodies, interacting with the parliamentary systems to form a regulatory state. 
Where markets have failed, or thought likely to fail, the state at different levels (UK, national and 
municipal) has supported studies and subsidized the provision of broadband Internet access. The 
regulator, using its sectoral antitrust powers, agreed with British Telecom to “functional separation”, 
transferring the enduring bottleneck of local access to a separate subsidiary. While the UK describes 
itself as a regulatory leader this is difficult to evaluate, given the number and the frequencies of 
changes, nonetheless the claim seems very difficult to substantiate. 
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II.  Introduction 
In what now seems another age, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) was 
one of the first countries to privatize its state provider of telecommunications and to open its market 
to competition.1 Until the early 1980s there was almost no need for regulation, since everything was 
undertaken directly and exclusively by the state through the Post Office, under the responsibility of 
the Postmaster General (PMG), a government minister. Since then policies, statutes and regulations 
have evolved and expanded, have been reformed and refined, often in concert with the other member 
states (MSs) of the European Union (EU), drawing selectively on lessons from the United States of 
America (USA) and Japan. Economic rivals, including those same MSs, also revised their policies and 
many now perform broadly as well as the UK, in terms of the services delivered to consumers and to 
enterprises – making similar contributions to productivity improvements and to economic growth.  
The most comprehensive international comparisons have been made by the European Commission 
(EC) in its annual implementation reports and by the OECD in its biennial Communications Outlook. 
Neither of these suggests that the UK is performing badly, but equally neither shows it to be doing 
especially well, with its position being solid but unremarkable. The OECD conducted a peer review of 
regulatory reform in 2001, which again suggested that UK performance was more than adequate.2 The 
exception is the ranking by the European Competitive Telecommunications Association (ECTA) 
which until recently showed the UK to be the European leader. While this has been challenged as 
being a subjective judgement, its creators argue that it shows the UK as being consistently the most 
attractive market in the European Union in which to invest. 
The UK is the archetypal regulatory state, with direct provision of a range of services having been 
replaced by a complex network of agencies, tribunals, service providers, business users, consumers 
and citizens. While formal ministerial responsibility lies with the Department for Culture, Media and 
Sport (DCMS), this is shared with other ministries in key areas of policy and strategy, notably with the 
Home Office on privacy and security, Department for Education on child protection and with both the 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) and HM Treasury on the economy and national 
competitiveness. Regulatory powers and some important aspects of policy were delegated to the 
regulator, the Office of Communications (OFCOM) which, in turn, delegated some of its powers to 
other, more obscure bodies. Devolution has given increasing roles to the three national assemblies and 
administrations. Consultations have become commonplace, even overwhelming.  
Beyond the UK, DCMS and OFCOM, participate in discussions and decision making at: 
  International Telecommunication Union (ITU); 
  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD);  
  European Union (EU); and 
  Commonwealth. 
The Department for International Development (DfID) supports some work on ICTs for 
development.3 
No longer is a decision taken in isolation, rather it is the result of the consideration of a range of 
domestic and foreign interests, and in the knowledge of practices and precedents at home and 
overseas. It is now inconceivable for a decision to be arrived at without informal lobbying, a formal 
consultation, generation of an impact assessment and, frequently, review by the courts. 
                                                            
1 See David Heald & David Steel, The privatisation of UK public enterprises, 52 ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND 
COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS 351 (1981), Stephen C Littlechild, Ten steps to denationalisation, 2 ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 11 
(1981), Gareth Locksley, London calling: A policy for telecommunications after privatization, 8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
POLICY 178 (1984) and Michael E Beesley, Liberalization of telecoms in the United Kingdom: Experiment or new 
direction?, 5 JURIMETRICS JOURNAL 22 (1984).  
2 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, REGULATORY REFORM IN UK: REGULATORY REFORM 
IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY (2002). 
3 Mostly in association with the International Development Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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This paper considers first the various roles of central government. The interventions by the different 
levels of government to support telecommunication initiatives are then reviewed. Next, the role of 
OFCOM is analyzed. The plethora of other regulatory bodies is briefly described and their functions 
explained. The operational separation agreement between OFCOM and BT is then reviewed. The 
relative performance of the UK in broadband Internet access is analyzed. The position of the UK in 
European Union policy-making is then described. Finally, conclusions are drawn and issues for 
further research identified.   
III.  Her Majesty’s Government  
Telecommunications policy has suffered from a division of responsibilities within government and 
from a sequence of structural changes to one of the two ministries. To compound this there has been a 
string of, frequently transient, junior ministers. 
The Blair administration, from taking office in 1997, identified the growth and application of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), the development of electronic services and the 
skills to use them as being crucial for the economy.4 The Department for Culture Media and Sport 
(DCMS) was created with a broad remit in the area of content, but only a secondary role in 
telecommunications. Responsibility lay with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the mission 
of which included: 
… long term objective of raising the rate of UK productivity growth over the economic 
cycle, improving competitiveness and narrowing the gap with our major industrial 
competitors.5  
This was supported by economic research to measure the effects of the adoption of technology in 
raising productivity.6 The drivers of that productivity growth were held to be:  
  Investment; 
  Innovation; 
  Skills; 
  Enterprise; and  
  Competition.  
With the transition from the Blair to the Brown Administration in June 2007, DTI was rebranded the 
Department of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), retaining its lead role for 
telecommunications. 7 The  only  significant  alteration  to  its remit was the addition of the Better 
Regulation Executive (BRE), transferred from the Cabinet Office.8 Telecommunications was assigned 
as one of several portfolios to the minister of state for competitiveness.9 
Competitiveness had been an element of government policy for some years. It is largely based on an 
approach developed at the Harvard Business School.10 This was subsequently adopted by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) at Davos, which publishes annual assessments of the relative performance of 
nations (see Table 1).11 After falling four positions in two years, the UK moved back up one place, with 
                                                            
4 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, OUR COMPETITIVE FUTURE: BUILDING THE KNOWLEDGE DRIVEN ECONOMY, 1998, 
Cm. 4176. 
5 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, DEPARTMENTAL REPORT 2006, 2006, Cm. 6826, at 17. 
6 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, RAISING UK PRODUCTIVITY, ECONOMICS PAPER NO. 8 (2004). 
7 HMG, Press Release, 29 June 2007. Available at: http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page12240.asp 
8 It saw, inter alia, the abolition of the venerable Board of Trade. In 1621 HM King James VI & I created the 
Committee of Privy Council for Trade and Foreign Plantations. Then on 23 August 1786 William Pitt put the 
Committee of Trade on a more formal basis by an Order in Council that remained in force until 2007. 
9 At that time Stephen Timms, MP PC. 
10 MICHAEL PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS (1990). 
11 THE GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2007-2008 (AUGUSTO LOPEZ-CLAROS ET AL. EDS., 2007). ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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the WEF noting the efficiency of its labour market “standing in contrast to the rigidity of many other 
European countries” and the “sophisticated and innovative businesses that are highly adept at 
harnessing the latest technologies for productivity improvements”.  
Table 1  Competitiveness ranking of the United Kingdom by the World Economic Forum12 
Year  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10  2010-11 
Rank  9  12  13  12 
Score  -  5.30  5.19  5.25 
         
In June 2009, Brown reshuffled his cabinet in an effort to revitalize his administration. He merged the 
Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS) with the Department for Business, 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), creating the Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills (BIS).13 It had a remarkably wide scope of responsibilities, with seven ministers, at the head of 
which stood the First Secretary of State, the Rt. Hon. The Lord Mandelson. 
The Cameron Administration initially followed the example of its predecessors in appointing a junior 
minister with a wide range of responsibilities, including telecommunications, responsible to two 
cabinet ministers. In May 2010, Ed Vaizey MP was made Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Minister) for 
Culture, Communications and Creative Industries.14 He was jointly responsible to the secretaries of 
state in BIS and DCMS, one from each of the coalition partners.  
In January 2011, the prime minister transferred from BIS to DCMS responsibility for competition and 
policy issues in media, broadcasting, the digital and telecommunications sectors.15 This followed some 
indiscreet remarks by the Secretary of State for BIS about a merger then under review in which he had 
a quasi-judicial role.16 The transfer resolved a somewhat awkward relationship over a number of years 
in which there had been joint responsibility of the business and culture ministries for a single 
converged regulator and an increasingly converged industry.  
Reflecting its perceived lack of importance, telecommunications has been one of several areas of 
responsibility of a non-cabinet minister. For most of the last two decades this post has seen many 
short-term appointments with reporting split between two relatively busy cabinet ministers.  
IV.  Better regulation 
Successive administrations have been keen to improve regulation and to reduce “red tape”, though 
the two are not synonymous, in order to encourage economic growth and job creation. This has been 
the responsibility of a number of units shuffled around government.  
The Blair administration created the Better Regulation Task Force (BRTF) in 1997 as an independent 
advisory body: 
… to ensure that regulation and its enforcement are proportionate, accountable, 
consistent, transparent and targeted. 
                                                            
12 http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness 
13 Changes to the machinery of Government, Number 10 press release, June 5, 2009. 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/number10.gov.uk/news/latest-news/2009/06/changes-to-the-
machinery-of-government-19525 
14 Vaizey is new broadband minister, PUBLIC SERVICE, May 21, 2010.  
http://www.publicservice.co.uk/news_story.asp?id=13021 
15 Transfer of responsibilities from BIS to DCMS, DCMS, Press release. January 18, 2011 
http://dcms.gov.uk/news/news_stories/7721.aspx 
16 Vince Cable: I have declared war on Rupert Murdoch, DAILY TELEGRAPH, December 21, 2010. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/liberaldemocrats/8217253/Vince-Cable-I-have-declared-war-on-Rupert-Murdoch.html ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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It was rebranded in January 2006 as the Better Regulation Commission (BRC), to act as an 
independent advisory body.17 It identified five principles of good regulatory practice:18 
  Proportionality; 
  Accountability; 
  Consistency; 
  Transparency; and  
  Targeting. 
The BRC aimed to assist in the reduction of unnecessary regulatory and administrative burdens and 
ensure that regulation conforms to the five principles. It argued that a “consultation culture” was 
necessary in order to ensure competitiveness by taking into account the views of stakeholders.19 
Following the adoption by HMG of its report “Public risk: the next frontier for better regulation”, the 
BRC was wound up.20 It was replaced by the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC) to ensure 
policy-making benefited from a fuller and more rounded consideration of public risk.21 It completed 
its work in April 2009 and also ceased.22  
That leaves the Better Regulation Executive (BRE) which presently sits within BIS, reporting to Mark 
Prisk MP, Minister of State for Business and Enterprise.23  It had been transferred to BERR on its 
creation, from the Cabinet Office. Its aims are: 
  To work with departments to improve the design of new regulations and how they are 
communicated; 
  To work with departments and regulators to simplify and modernise existing regulations; and 
  To work with regulators (including local authorities) and departments to change attitudes and 
approaches to regulation to become more risk-based. 
Separately HMG commissioned a report on the administrative burden of regulation, focusing on the 
forms required to be filled by businesses and the inspections made of their operations and records.24 It 
considered 674 regulatory bodies that employed 61,000 people and cost £4,000 million per annum. The 
report suggested ways in which the burden of regulation might be reduced, in particular by focusing 
on an assessment of the risk of non-compliance and ways in which regulators might share their 
experiences.  
While government has aspired to improve regulation, this has had limited effect in the 
telecommunications sector. Despite occasional proposals for efforts to reassess the need for swathes of 
regulation, few have actually been removed. 
V.  Parliamentary oversight 
Select committees of the House of Commons monitor the work of government departments, 
reconfiguring with the changes made by successive prime ministers to the structure of their 
administrations. Telecommunications is now under the Culture, Media & Sport Committee, having 
                                                            
17 http://www.brc.gov.uk/ 
18 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/brc/ 
19 Europe needs a ‘consultation culture’ to regulate better and be more competitive, Better Regulation Commission, press 
release, September 22, 2005.  
Available at: http://www.brc.gov.uk/news/2005/euconsultation.aspx 
20 BETTER REGULATION COMMISSION, PUBLIC RISK – THE  NEXT FRONTIER FOR BETTER REGULATION (2008) 
21 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100807034701/http://www.berr.gov.uk/about/economics-
statistics/rrac/index.html 
22 RISK AND REGULATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, RESPONSE WITH RESPONSIBILITY: POLICY-MAKING FOR PUBLIC RISK IN THE 
21ST CENTURY (2009). 
23 http://www.berr.gov.uk/bre/ 
24 PHILIP HAMPTON, REDUCING ADMINISTRATIVE BURDENS: EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT (2005). ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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previously been under BIS, BERR and Trade & Industry Committees (see Table 2).25 Additionally, the 
Public Accounts Committee has a general oversight of government departments and recently 
reviewed the effectiveness of OFCOM.26 
Table 2  Parliamentary inquiries into telecommunications 
Session  Committee  Subject  Report  
2010-11  Culture, Media & Sport  Spectrum+  1258-i 
2010-11  Culture, Media & Sport  DCMS annual review and minister’s powers  458-i 
2010-11  Culture, Media & Sport  The work of OFCOM*  956-i 
2010-11  Culture, Media & Sport  Responsibilities of DCMS  915 
2010-11  Public Accounts Committee  OFCOM: the effectiveness of converged regulation  688 
2010-11  Comptroller & Auditor General  OFCOM: the effectiveness of converged regulation  490 
2009-10  Culture, Media & Sport  OFCOM Annual Plan 2009-10  77 
2009-10  Business, Innovation & Skills  Broadband  7227 
2009-10  Business, Innovation & Skills  The creation of the Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills and the Departmental Annual Report 2008–09 
160 
2009-10  Business, Innovation & Skills  OFCOM Annual Plan 2009-10*  77 
2008-09  Culture, Media & Sport (jointly 
with Business & Enterprise) 
Pre-appointment hearing with the Chairman-elect of 
OFCOM, Dr Colette Bowe* 
119 
2008-09  Business & Enterprise  Digital Britain*  331-i 
2007-08  Business & Enterprise  Annual Report and Scrutiny of the Department for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
1116 
2007-08  Culture, Media & Sport  Harmful content on the Internet and in video games  353-I,II 
2007-08  Business & Enterprise  OFCOM Annual Plan 2008-09  494 
2007-08  Business & Enterprise  Departmental Annual Report and Accounts 2006-07*  108-i 
2006-07  Trade & Industry (jointly with 
Culture, Media & Sport) 
OFCOM Annual Plan 2007-08*  459-i 
2005-06  Comptroller & Auditor General  The creation of OFCOM: wider lessons for public sector 
mergers of regulatory agencies 
1175 
2005-06  Culture, Media & Sport (jointly 
with Trade & Industry) 
Ofcom Annual Plan 2006-07*  1083-i 
2004-05  Trade & Industry  OFCOM’s Strategic Review of Telecommunications  407-I,II 
2004-05  Trade & Industry  Progress towards the Knowledge Driven Economy  432 
2003-04  Trade & Industry  UK Broadband Market  321-I,II 
2002-03  Trade & Industry  Radio Spectrum Management  128-I,II 
2000-01  Trade & Industry  Local Loop Unbundling  90 
* Oral evidence, no formal report. 
+ Written evidence, no formal report. 
 
There is no corresponding committee in the House of Lords, though several take an interest in 
different aspects, including:28 
  Communications Committee; 
  Economic Affairs Committee; and 
  Delegated Powers & Regulatory Reform Committee.  
In 2003, a House of Lords committee reported on the regulatory state, describing the almost byzantine 
relationships that had been built up over many years (see figure 1).29  
                                                            
25 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/culture-media-and-sport-committee/ 
26 HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, 20TH REPORT - OFCOM: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONVERGED 
REGULATION, HC 688 (2011). 
27 HOUSE OF COMMONS BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, BROADBAND: FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009–
10. HC 72. 
28 http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/ ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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Figure 1  The regulatory state30 
 
Following up on this, a committee examined the role of the various economic regulators, in particular 
their use of light-touch regulation and Impact Assessments (IAs).31 It  concluded  that  there  was  a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
29 HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE REGULATORY STATE, 2003-04, HL 68. 
30 HOUSE OF LORDS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION, THE REGULATORY STATE, 2003-04, HL 68, Appendix 4.   
31 HOUSE OF LORDS, SELECT COMMITTEE ON REGULATORS, UK ECONOMIC REGULATORS, 2006-07, HL 189.  
See also: NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC REGULATORS’ IMPACT ASSESSMENTS (2007). ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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“crucial need for greater parliamentary oversight” of the various bodies. It called for a more formal 
Joint Regulators Group (JRG) to ensure improved sharing of best practice and for periodic reviews by 
the Competition Commission to scale back the work of the sectoral regulators. 
This works seems to have ground to a halt, in terms of any systematic analysis of the possible reform 
of the institutions of governance.  
The Cameron administration promised a “bonfire of the QUANGOs”, parts of which were embedded 
in individual decisions. The core was contained in the Public Bodies Bill, which was criticized by the 
Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee for giving too much power to ministers.32  
The House of Commons has a Europe Scrutiny Committee to consider all legislation and other 
documents from the EU, together with the positions being taken by HMG in the Council of 
Ministers.33 However, the House of Lords is expected to carry the greater share of the work, with an 
EU Committee and seven sub-committees examining legislation in detail. 34  For  example,  it 
investigated the proposal from the EC in 2006 to regulate international mobile roaming charges.35 
It is very difficult even for a bicameral legislature to superintend the degrees of complexity found in 
the regulatory state. Inevitably, it focuses on the minister and a few major issues. Committees cannot 
go into the detail, unless it is structured in a way that makes it much more accessible with cascading 
reporting, almost like back-to-back service level agreements. It is too easy to hide large areas of 
activity by its complexity and by consultations of stakeholders.  
VI.  Digital strategies  
The Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and the DTI, with contributions from other ministries and some 
operators, set out a digital strategy for the UK in 2005.36 It was to comprise the following actions: 
1.  Transform learning with ICT; 
2.  Set up a “Digital Challenge” for Local Authorities to achieve both excellence and equity in 
ICT; 
3.  Make the UK the safest place to use the Internet; 
4.  Promote the creation of innovative broadband content; 
5.  Set out a strategy for transformation of delivery of key public services; 
6.  OFCOM to set out a regulatory strategy; 
7.  Improve accessibility to technology for the digitally excluded and ease of use for the 
disabled; and  
8.  Review the digital divide in 2008. 
None of these is very specific, with HMG failing to define any Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
which it might have used to measure its own achievements and those of OFCOM. 
The direction to OFCOM to create a “regulatory strategy” can be considered a substitute for a policy, 
allowing it a very free hand within the broad terms of the Communications Act 2003. It stands in stark 
contrast to the simple target of 2.0 per cent for inflation set for the Bank of England.37 Moreover, the 
Bank operates at a much higher level of transparency, publishing the minutes of the Monetary Policy 
Committee in making decisions about the achievement of its target and writing to the Chancellor 
when it fails to achieve that target. 
                                                            




35 HOUSE OF LORDS, EUROPEAN UNION COMMITTEE, MOBILE PHONE CHARGES IN THE EU, 2006–07, HL 79.  
36 PRIME MINISTER’S STRATEGY UNIT AND DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, CONNECTING THE UK: THE DIGITAL 
STRATEGY (2005). 
37 Letter from Chancellor of the Exchequer to Monetary Policy Committee, March 21, 2007.  ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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The emphasis of planning moved to broadband, which has to fit within the general framework of the 
EU treaties and UK legislation, not least the EU state aid rules, based on TFEU Article 109. An 
important step was the Caio Report, which warned that many of the issues on next generation access 
(NGA) were remote from the concerns of the general public but argued that it would become an 
“essential digital utility”.38 He rejected the case for short term intervention, arguing that over five to 
ten years HMG would have to ensure the availability of NGA. In response, the Brown Administration 
announced it was to modernise and upgrade the access networks and committed that by 2012 at least 
2 Mbps would be available to every home over the existing copper lines.39 Affordability was being 
addressed through a £300 million Home Access scheme and there was to be a plan for digital 
participation.  
An inquiry by the Business Innovation and Skills Committee called for a full-time broadband minister 
and supported the proposal for a universal service commitment to 2 Mbps as “an appropriate and 
achievable ambition” for all users.40 However, it considered the proposal to intervene in the NGA 
unwise in the absence of pent-up demand, while it rejected the proposal to fund the intervention by a 
£0.50 monthly levy on fixed telephone lines, as both regressive and poorly targeted. It argued that: “In 
times of great stringency in public expenditure, digital inclusion not Next Generation Access should 
be the priority for expenditure”. 
In March 2010, HMG launched its National Plan for Digital Participation, with the intention that 
“everyone who wants to be online to get online, do more online and benefit from the advantages of 
being online”.41 It was estimated that the total economic benefits from getting everyone in the UK 
online was in excess of £22 billion.42  
The Cameron Administration assigned £530 million to BDUK in the spending review for 2010-15. Four 
rural market pilots were selected to improve understanding of how superfast broadband might be 
made commercially viable in rural communities. It sought to ensure the rapid rollout of “superfast 
broadband” in both urban and rural areas, ensuring the provision of an acceptable level those parts of 
the country that had been excluded.43 The change in terminology appears to be more a reflection of the 
transition from Brown to Cameron, than any technical change. “In simple terms, the Government 
wanted the UK to have the best superfast broadband network in Europe by 2015.” It is far from clear 
what “best” means, a vagueness that must make its achievement less likely. 
In mid-2011, HMG announced financial support for broadband.44 It proposed to spend £294.8 million 
in English counties and £68.8 million in Scotland, from a total of £530 million intend to achieve 90 per 
cent of homes and businesses having access to superfast broadband and the guaranteed minimum of 
2Mbps. English county councils and local enterprise partnerships leading broadband roll-out are 
expected to draw up a delivery plan and to match the HMG’s investment with European, their own or 
private funds.  
Broadband adoption has continued to increase in the UK, with rural areas showing strong growth (see 
Figure 2).45 Scotland is stagnating, while there is preliminary evidence of homes giving up broadband 
in parts of England and presumably in Scotland.  
                                                            
38 FRANCESCO CAIO, THE NEXT PHASE OF BROADBAND UK: ACTION NOW FOR LONG TERM COMPETITIVENESS (2008). 
39 HMG, DIGITAL BRITAIN: FINAL REPORT, Cm 7650 (2009). 
40 BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, BROADBAND: FOURTH REPORT OF SESSION 2009-10 HC 72 (2009). 
41 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS, NATIONAL PLAN FOR DIGITAL PARTICIPATION (2010). 
42 PWC, CHAMPION FOR DIGITAL INCLUSION: THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR DIGITAL INCLUSION (2009). 
43 DEPARTMENT FOR BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS, BRITAIN’S SUPERFAST BROADBAND FUTURE (2010) 
44 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, £363 million to 'take broadband to all' in England and Scotland.  
http://www.culture.gov.uk/news/news_stories/8389.aspx 
45 Ewan Sutherland, A Brief Note on Broadband Statistics in the United Kingdom, SSRN (2011). 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1789569 ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
10 
Figure 2  Broadband in first quarter of year46 (note: no data available for 2007) 
 
HMG takes a strong interest in providing electronic services and information to citizens, though 
without much evidence of enthusiastic demand. An independent review into the “power of 
information” explored developments in the use of public information generated by citizens and the 
state. Government responded with three challenges for itself:47 
  Engaging in partnership with user-led online communities; 
  Ensuring that it fully understands and responds appropriately to changes in the 
information market; and 
  Advising civil servants on how best to participate in new media. 
These issues were taken up by a Taskforce, which reported in early 2009.48 It called for a capability 
within the public sector to work with both internal and external innovators, to improve the ways in 
which government consulted with the public and to build capacity in the public sector to take 
advantage of the opportunities from digital technologies. It also sought to ensure that public sector 
information was made as simple as possible for people to find and use and the freeing up of the 
mapping and address data for use in new services. 
Government has a poor record in its use of ICTs, with projects running over budget, over schedule 
and failing.49 It is not clear that it has performed any better with information. 
                                                            
46 OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, THE COMMUNICATIONS MARKET (2011). 
47 CABINET OFFICE, THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE POWER OF INFORMATION: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW, BY ED 
MAYO AND TOM STEINBERG, 2006-07, Cm. 7157. 
48 CABINET OFFICE, POWER OF INFORMATION TASKFORCE REPORT (2009). 
http://poit.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/poit/wp-content/uploads/2009/03/poit-report-final-pdf.pdf 
49 See JUSTINE STEPHEN, JAMES PAGE, JERRETT MYERS, ADRIAN BROWN, DAVID WATSON & IAN MAGEE, SYSTEM ERROR: 
FIXING THE FLAWS IN GOVERNMENT IT, Institute for Government (2011), HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ACCOUNTS 
COMMITTEE, 45TH REPORT - THE NATIONAL PROGRAMME FOR IT IN THE NHS: AN UPDATE ON THE DELIVERY OF 
DETAILED CARE RECORDS SYSTEMS, HC 1070 (2011), HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, 40TH REPORT 
- INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY IN GOVERNMENT, HC 1050 (2011), HOUSE OF COMMONS PUBLIC 
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The overall performance of the UK can be seen in the biennial OECD Communications Outlook and 
the STI Scoreboard which compares the thirty countries on a variety of indicators (see tables 3 and 4). 
Across a wide range of indicators performance inevitably varies but it would be hard to describe the 
UK as being especially good. 
Table 3  Ranking of the UK in OECD Communications Outlook50 
  2007  2011 
Access line market share of new entrants  2nd  Table 2.2  Table 2.2  1st 
Public telecoms investment per capita  3rd  Figure 4.15  Figure 3.10  17th 
Monthly household expenditure  6th  Figure 2.3  Figure 8.7  14th 
Telecoms access paths per 100 population  6th  Figure 4.4  Table 4.4  4th 
Mobile high-user basket  7th  Figure 7.12  -  - 
Residential fixed-line basket high usage  10th  Figure 7.6  -  - 
Mobile low-user basket  10th  Figure 7.10  -  - 
Residential fixed-line basket medium usage  11th  Figure 7.6  -  - 
Fixed Internet access per 100 population  11th  Figure 5.7  Table 4.13  11th 
Mobile medium-user basket  12th  Figure 7.11  -  - 
Bot-infested machines per 100 population  12th  Figure 5.13  -  - 
Residential fixed-line basket low usage  13th  Figure 7.5  -  - 
Mobile share of total revenue  13th  Figure 3.6  Figure 3.6  33rd 
Fastest broadband download speeds  16th  Figure 4.11  Figure 4.11  12
th 
Yearly price of national leased lines basket 2Mbps  16th  Figure 7.19  Figure 7.6  5th 
Mobile revenue per subscriber  17th  Figure 3.8  Figure 3.7  29th 
Public telecoms revenue per communications access path  23rd  Figure 3.3  Figure 3.3  18th 
         
Table 4  Ranking of the UK in the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard51 
  2007  2011 
Country share of ICT patents    4th    E.15     
Investment in ICT    4th    E.11 
Software investment    4th    E.13 
Growth in business sector services labour productivity    7th    I.4     
Internet use by business – have own website    9th    E.7 
Share of gross value-added high technology industries    10th    I.5 
ICT patents as percentage of national total    11th    E.15 
Individuals using the Internet – female    12th    E.6 
Internet use by business – have broadband    15th    E.7 
Individuals using the Internet – male     15th    E.6 
       
A number of new entrant operators proposed measures to evaluate regulation in terms of investment 
and market concentration in Europe which are presented in the ECTA scorecard (see Table 5).52 
Although its score has varied quite widely, the UK consistently held first place, though its lead was 
been greatly reduced and finally lost to the Netherlands.  
The ECTA Scorecard was devised as a means for new entrants to push regulators to impose tougher 
access conditions on incumbent operators. ETNO, representing the incumbent operators, has had a 
critique prepared, noting the subjective nature of the assessment of regulatory effectiveness and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE, 43RD REPORT - THE USE OF INFORMATION TO MANAGE THE DEFENCE LOGISTICS SUPPLY CHAIN, HC 
1202 (2011).  
50 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK (2007). 
51 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INDUSTRY 
SCOREBOARD: 2007 (2007). 
52 http://www.ectaportal.com/ ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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complaining that ECTA equated more regulation with good regulation, without considering market 
conditions.53 
Table 5  ECTA regulatory scorecard54 
  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Netherlands   270  296  344  381  362  376 
UK  379  440  390  385  373  368 
Denmark  309  398  356  350  344  354 
Norway        319  360  341 
France  255  349  345  304  322  321 
Finland       266  263  300  306 
Italy  291  311  300  285  302  303 
Portugal    300  275  279  286  302 
Ireland  317  327  290  261  302  317 
Spain  257  291  295  276  266  294 
Belgium   214  281  248  228  254  281 
Sweden  276  311  306  285  265  277 
Austria     339  266  257  282  271 
Hungary    286  293  241  282  264 
Germany   203  220  231  254  280  258 
Greece     218  224  216  247  251 
Poland     230  203  197  180  243 
Slovenia        238  251  232 
Turkey          140  213 
Switzerland            209 
Czech Republic      251  203  190  192 
Bulgaria            165 
             
There are a number of composite indices used to rank large and diverse groups of nations (see Table 
6). In all of these the UK can be considered to have good or very good ratings. 
Table 6  The ranking of the UK in international comparisons 
Agency  Index  2005  Current 
UN Development Programme  Human Development Index (HDI)    26
th (0.849) 
ITU/UNCTAD   Digital Opportunity Index (DOI)    - 
World Economic Forum  Network Readiness Index (NRI)    15
th (5.12) 
Economist Intelligence Unit  Digital Economy Ranking  -  14
th (7.89) 
       
The concerns of HMG are, on the one hand, helping UK businesses to be competitive and on the other 
making government services available to citizens. It delegated to OFCOM management of 
telecommunications markets on the assumption that properly regulated markets would deliver all the 
inputs to the UK economy required to achieve its overarching productivity and growth goals. In 
parallel to this has been the continuing evolution of regulation, regulatory structures and processes. 
Its own use of ICTs has been consistently weak for many years.  
VII. Think tanks and lobby groups 
There is a large set of professional and industry associations of varying degrees of formality and 
engagement with government: 
                                                            
53 MELVYN WEEKS AND BRIAN WILLIAMSON, A SOUND BASIS FOR EVIDENCE BASED POLICY? A CRITIQUE OF THE ECTA 
REGULATORY SCORECARD AND SPC NETWORK PAPERS ON INVESTMENT AND BROADBAND: A REPORT FOR ETNO BY 
INDEPEN (2006). 
54 http://www.ectaportal.com/en/REPORTS/Regulatory-Scorecards/Regulatory-Scorecard-Overview/ ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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  Broadband Stakeholders Group (BSG): the “UK government’s leading advisory group on 
broadband” comprising “organisations across the converging broadband value-chain” which 
discusses key policy, regulatory and commercial issues;55  
  Intellect: the collective voice of more than 800 members from the technology industry, 
including software and IT services, telecommunications and electronics;  
  Parliamentary Information Technology Committee (PITCOM): a 25 year-old associate 
parliamentary group bringing together politicians and the ICT industry;  
  EURIM The Information Society Alliance: Politicians, officials and industry working to 
improve the quality of policy formation, consultation, scrutiny, implementation and 
monitoring in support of the creation of a globally competitive, socially inclusive and 
democratically accountable information society; and 
  Information Age Partnership (IAP) operated between 1998 and 2010 as a policy forum 
including ministers, senior officials and the CEOs of leading firms in the ICT, communications 
and content industries. 
There are commercial conference organizers such as Informa.56 There are some that are closer to the 
political agenda, such as the Westminster eForum.57  
There are groupings of operators: 
  UK Competitive Telecommunications Association (UKCTA) for new entrants; 
  Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA); 
  Internet Telephony Services Providers’ Association; 
  Mobile Operators Association (MOA); and  
  Mobile Broadband Group (MBG). 
The leading practitioner bodies are:  
  British Computer Society (BCS);58 and  
  Institute of Engineering and Technology (IET).59  
A more conflicted organization is the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), with members that are 
both incumbent and new entrant operators, plus their corporate customers.60  
There are many opportunities for individuals from industry and, to a lesser extent, professional 
telecommunications managers to engage with government and regulators with a specific brief for 
consultation or a more general debate of issues. Participation is somewhat expensive in time, effort 
and money.  
VIII.  Academic research 
Despite the relatively large size of the UK academic community there are few active centres engaged 
in telecommunications policy to differing extents (see Table 7). Many of these are focused on global 
issues, rather than on their application in the UK. This is driven by the need to support taught and 
research post-graduate students, drawn mainly from overseas. There are a small number of 
postgraduate degrees on management and legal aspects of telecommunications, such as the Master of 
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Communications Management (MCM) at the University of Strathclyde and the LLM in Computer and 
Communications Law at Queen Mary University.61  
One of the most active researchers and consultants, to both operators and governments, has been 
Cave, now at Imperial College. He contributed the metaphor of the ladder of investment, something 
he has revised from time to time, though more recent contributions make only passing references to 
the UK.62 Access to unbundled loops, one of the rungs of the ladder, has been addressed, analysing the 
emergence from the OFCOM strategic review of the notion of equality of access and the establishment 
of Openreach within BT.63 There has been some work on consumer adoption of broadband.64, 65 
Table 7  Research activity in UK universities66 
Institution  Unit 
Imperial College (London)  Tanaka Business School 
London School of Economics  Media@LSE 
Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR) 
Queen Mary University  Institute of Computer and Communications Law 
University of East Anglia (Norwich)  Centre for Competition Policy 
University of Essex (Colchester)  Essex Centre for Comparative and European Law 
University of Manchester  Centre for Development Informatics (CDI) 
University of Oxford  Oxford Internet Institute (OII) 
University of Strathclyde (Glasgow)  Department of Management Studies 
Swansea University  School of Business and Economics 
   
There are a variety of reasons for the low volume of publications. The institutional economic drivers 
favour overseas and especially non-EU students, meaning that UK material is of limited application in 
teaching or in doctoral research. Some UK work is undertaken for parties active in policy and 
regulatory debates, making publication of such material both difficult and unnecessary. Other 
contributions are to a more academic debate, not intended to influence public policy debates. 
IX.  Office of Communications 
The Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) had been created in 1984 as an independent, non-
ministerial department to be the first regulator under Professor (later Sir) Bryan Carsberg.67 It was 
replicated with the creation of a variety of other sectoral regulators.  
The Communications Act of 2003 created a single “converged” regulator, the Office of 
Communications (OFCOM), by merging the following: 
                                                            
61 A similar programme is operated by Coventry University, apparently by external teachers, since there is no 
record of any research output. There was also a course at the University of Westminster.  
62 Martin E Cave, Snakes and ladders: Unbundling in a next generation world, 34 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 80 
(2010). 
63 Jason Whalley & Peter Curwen, Equality of access and local loop unbundling in the UK broadband telecommunications 
market, 25 TELEMATICS AND INFORMATICS 280 (2008). 
64 Yogesh K. Dwivedi, Banita Lal & Michael D. Williams, Managing consumer adoption of broadband: Examining 
drivers and barriers, 109 INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT & DATA SYSTEMS 357 (2009). 
65 Yogesh K. Dwivedi, Navonil Mustafee, Michael D. Williams & Banita Lal, Developing a broadband adoption model 
in the UK context pp. 192–208 in J. Pries-Heje et al. (Eds.): IS DESIGN SCIENCE RESEARCH, IFIP AICT 318 (2010). 
66 Additionally, two specialist units have recently closed: Centre for Regulated Industries (Bath)  and Centre for 
Management under Regulation (Warwick). 
67 P. Gist, The role of Oftel, 14 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 26 (1990), Mark Thatcher, Regulatory reform in Britain 
and France: Organizational structure and the extension of competition, 1 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 441 
(1994), ROBIN MANSELL, THE NEW TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NETWORK EVOLUTION (1993). 
Jon Stern, Regulatory forbearance: why did Oftel find it so hard? 28 TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 273. ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
15 
  Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL); 
  Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC); 
  Independent Television Commission (ITC); 
  Radiocommunications Agency (RA); and 
  Radio Authority. 
The National Audit Office (NAO) identified lessons for mergers of regulatory authorities.68 
OFCOM combines the functions of the moral guardian for broadcasting, the competition authority for 
the sector, the protector of the citizen-consumer in communication markets, the sponsor of the sector 
and is both regulator and policymaker. 
The 2003 Act was the means to implement the European Union 2002 Directives, sometimes known as 
the telecommunications regulatory package.69 
The UK legislative process began in 2000 with a white paper setting out the proposals of HMG.70 The 
Culture Committee of the House of Commons then produced a report.71 In turn HMG responded to 
that report.72 Finally, the Bill was laid before Parliament, debated and given the Royal Assent on 17 
July 2003, a few days before the EU implementation deadline. 
In many countries competition law powers remain with a traditional horizontal authority with which 
the regulator is expected to collaborate. In the UK, the approach has been different, with concurrent 
powers given to the sectoral regulators (see figure 2). Thus the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) – the 
national competition authority – shares its jurisdiction with OFCOM concerning implementation of: 
  Competition Act 1998;73 
  Enterprise Act 2002; and  
  Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union. 
The EU framework was amended in 2009.74 As this was being implemented, HMG launched a wide-
ranging consultation, with a view to producing a green paper, to be followed by a white paper and 
bill, scheduled for 2013.75  
Appeals against decisions of both OFCOM and the CC are heard by the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT) and both can refer matters for further investigation to the Competition Commission.76 The CAT 
can seek an opinion of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) if this is necessary.  
The Competition Commission (CC) reviewed the appeals process for telecommunications.77 This dealt 
with a relatively narrow class of cases in which, under s.193 of the Communications Act 2003, 
operators can appeal to the CAT against price control decisions made by OFCOM, which is then 
                                                            
68 NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE, THE CREATION OF OFCOM: WIDER LESSONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR MERGERS OF REGULATORY 
AGENCIES, 2005-2006, HC 1175. 
69 PAUL NIHOUL & PETER RODFORD, EU ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS LAW: COMPETITION AND REGULATION IN THE 
EUROPEAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKET (2004). 
70 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY AND DEPARTMENT FOR CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, A NEW FUTURE FOR 
COMMUNICATIONS, 1999-2000, Cm. 5010. 
71 House OF COMMONS, CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE: COMMUNICATIONS, 2001-02, HC 539.  
72 DEPARTMENT OF CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, THE COMMUNICATIONS WHITE PAPER: GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE 
SECOND REPORT FROM THE CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT SELECT COMMITTEE, 2000–2001, Cm. 5316. 
73 As amended by The Competition Act 1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations, 2004, S.I. 
2004/1261. 
74 EU Directive 2009/140/EC, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 37-69 implemented in the UK by The Electronic Communications 
and Wireless Telegraphy Regulations, 2011, SI 2011/1210. 
75 http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/commsreview-open-letter_160511.pdf 
76 The Competition Appeal Tribunal Rules, 2003, S.I. 2003/1372. 
77 http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/consultations/current/pdf/report_of_review.pdf ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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required to refer the matter to the CC if there is a dispute on pricing issues. The CC launched a 
consultation on proposed guidance.78 It received five submissions, to which it indicated its responses.79 
Figure 3  The antitrust system in the United Kingdom 80 
 
One of the characteristics of OFCOM has been its almost overwhelming enthusiasm for the 
consultation of “stakeholders”. It published over five thousand pages in 2006, excluding broadcasting. 
Several hundred additional pages were published in a variety of reports. 
Despite the importance attached to consultations, there are relatively few responses, even on some 
relatively important topics (see Table 8). Most individuals and organizations are excluded by the 
obscurity of the topics and by the complexity of the issues. The scale of effort required to respond to a 
majority of the consultations is considerable and is only achieved by BT and, in their area, by the five 
mobile operators. In particular, the very small number of responses from the Consumer Association, 
the National Consumer Council (NCC) and the Communication Management Association (CMA) is 
noticeable, they carefully focus their resources on a few key issues.   
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Table 8  Responses to selected OFCOM consultation in 2007 
  VoIP-999  NP  MTR  numbers  payphones  mis-selling  charge-
control 
BT  √  √  √  √  √  √  √ 
C&W  √  √  √  √       
3/HWL    √  √        √ 
O2    √  √      √  √ 
Orange    √          √ 
T-Mobile  √    √        √ 
Vodafone    √          √ 
UKCTA  √          √   
others  21  15  0  5  3  7  - 
               
The Scottish and Welsh Administrations respond to some OFCOM consultations. This requires 
OFCOM to engage with democratically elected bodies other than the UK Parliament. It indicates of 
the complexity of the present constitutional arrangements. 
Ministers have taken limited interest in telecommunications, leaving OFCOM not only to implement 
regulation, but also to develop policy: 
The Department does not lead but is responsible for the regulatory framework and has 
an influence over Ofcom’s review process, which will stimulate market activity even 
further.81 
The “framework” is the legislation, both domestic and European, with “implementation” including 
significant measures of policy. OFCOM describes itself as a new breed of regulator, embracing areas 
of activity previously reserved for government.82  
OFCOM has two very general considerations: 83 
It shall be the principal duty of OFCOM, in carrying out their functions— 
(a) to further the interests of citizens in relation to communications matters; and 
(b) to further the interests of consumers in relevant markets, where appropriate by 
promoting competition. 
This formulation creates a gap, since there is no explicit reference to business customers, obliging 
OFCOM to extrapolate from these a rationale for considering their interests. The large businesses are 
unconvinced that they receive the level of attention from OFCOM that they deserve.  
The CEO of OFCOM called for politically independent regulators in the European Union, criticizing 
other NRAs for being too close to state-owned operators.84 This is despite his having served as a policy 
advisor to Gordon Brown and a senior policy advisor to Tony Blair before joining OFCOM, leading 
some to suggest that he is not very distant from Downing Street.85 He argued that politicians should 
stay out of the detail, only setting long term goals and not “interfering”. This is a very hard distinction 
to draw, especially in a fast moving sector where short term issues can be or quickly become strategic. 
It is highly unlikely that other countries will devolve policy to an unelected agency. 
                                                            
81 DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, DEPARTMENTAL REPORT 2006, Cm. 6826, §2.163. 
82 Peter Phillips, Unelected and Unaccountable? The role of the regulator in setting public policy, Presentation to 
the Institute of Economic Affairs, 4 July 2007. 
83 Communications Act, 2003, §3. 
84 Ed Richards, Speech on European Framework to the 8th Annual Telecoms Regulation and Competition Law 
Conference. 31 October 2007. 
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OFCOM annual plans have been presented to the House of Commons.86 For day-to-day relations an 
OFCOM board member has responsibility, supported by a team, there are also teams in each of the 
four nations liasing with the devolved administrations and agencies.  
The structure of OFCOM is of a board of up to ten persons, including non-executive members 
appointed by the Secretary of State for DCMS and members of the senior management team (the 
OFCOM Executive). There are several committees of the OFCOM board of which the following have 
delegated powers: 
  Executive Committee; 
  Policy Executive; 
  Spectrum Clearance and Awards Programme Management Board (800 and 2600 MHz);  
  Operations Board 
  Content Board – regulation of television and radio quality and standards; 
  Community Radio Fund Panel;87 
  Content Sanctions Committee: considers statutory sanctions in content or content-based cases 
in broadcasting recommended to it by the OFCOM Executive 
  Radio Licensing Committee 
  Fairness Committee: fairness and privacy complaints in broadcasting 
  Election Committee: disputes about the allocation, scheduling or duration of Party Election 
Broadcasts on radio and television 
  OFCOM & BBC Joint Steering Group88 
There are also conventional governance committees for audit, remuneration and nominations.  
To assist OFCOM there are the following advisory committees: 
  Consumer Panel;89 
  Older and Disabled Persons; 
  Committees for the Nations: 
o  England, 
o  Northern Ireland, 
o  Scotland, 
o  Wales; and 
  Spectrum Advisory Board. 
The national committees continue a long tradition, dating back through OFTEL to the Post Office 
which had regional user committees. 
OFCOM is a relatively costly agency for the UK, though this goes unnoticed by consumers, since they 
pay for it through their telephone bills in charges, levied by the operators. Its spending is limited by 
HM Treasury in regular negotiations. The regulator and the regulated engage each other in complex 
processes that again are unnoticed by consumers and citizens because of their obscure and arcane 
nature. In the absence of any goals set by government, political oversight has largely been lost. 
X.  Other regulatory and consultative bodies 
In addition to OFCOM and the various national ministries, assemblies and parliaments, there is a host 
of other agencies (see Table 9). There are also non-telecommunications mechanisms for consumer 
protection, through local trading standards offices, the National Consumer Council and the small 
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87 Fulfilling §359 of the Communications Act 2003. 
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claims courts. Additionally, some complaints are made directly to Members of Parliament (MPs) and, 
for international mobile roaming, to Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Each plays a role in 
the governance of telecommunications.  
All advertising in the United Kingdom is under the control of the Advertising Standards Authority 
(ASA).90  This states that it is an independent, self-regulatory body established by the advertising 
industry to adjudicate on two codes, one for broadcast and another for non-broadcast advertising (see 
Table 10).91 As with other regulatory bodies in the UK it publishes its codes, an annual statement or 
work plan and follows this up in an annual report. It also publishes adjudications on the many 
complaints it receives about specific advertisements. Behind the ASA stands a substantial protection 
for consumers in the form of EU directives and UK legislation.  
Table 9  Ancillary regulatory bodies in the United Kingdom 
Body  Status  Scope 
Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)  Independent  Content of advertisements 
Communications & Internet Services 
Adjudication Scheme (CISAS) 
Independent*  Dispute settlement for consumers and SMEs 
Consult 21   BT  Consultation with Communication Providers on BT’s 
21st Century Network (21CN) 
Gambling Commission  Statutory  Powers under Gambling Act 2005 to regulate 
commercial gambling 
Information Commissioner (ICO)   Statutory   To uphold information rights in the public interest, 
promoting openness by public bodies and data 
privacy for individuals 
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)  Self-regulatory  Internet Hotline for the public and IT professionals to 
report criminal online content in a secure and 
confidential way 
Network Interoperability Consultative 
Committee (NICC) 
Independent  A technical forum for the communications sector that 
develops interoperability standards for public 
communications networks and services 
Next Generation Networks UK (NGNuk)  Independent*  A co-ordination forum for key investors in NGN 
infrastructure and services 
Office of the Telecommunications 
Adjudicator (OTA
2) 
Independent*  Assist Scheme Members to reach agreement on and, 
where necessary, make non-binding 
recommendations on appropriate product 
functionality, process specifications, change 
management, implementation plans and monitoring 
Ombudsman Services: Communications  Independent*  Resolve complaints from consumers about companies 
which provide communications services to the public 
Phonepay Plus  Independent*  Regulator of premium rate services 
* OFCOM approved. 
 
The engagements of the ASA with telecommunications are two-fold, advertisements for 
telecommunications services and advertisements carried to customers by means of 
telecommunications. For example, it has published guidance for adverts on interactive television.92 
Among the complaints about telecommunications have been issues of the pricing of elements in 
multiple play bundles, where providers have sometimes been found to have broken the rules. Some 
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disputes had previously arisen over descriptions of the relative quality of the mobile networks. A 
similar problem arose over advertised claims about the available speed for broadband. In November 
2007, the ASA held that Virgin Media had failed to make clear that speeds were “up to” 10 Mbps, 
though it noted that most users would get this speed most of the time.93 The wider issue was then 
taken up by the OFCOM Consumer Panel and subsequently by OFCOM.94 
 
Table 10  Selected recent adjudications by the Advertising Standards Authority 
Talk Talk  
Telecom  
(149509) 
“We did not consider that that methodology was sufficiently robust to support a savings claim [of up to 
£140] because customers who had switched to TalkTalk were more likely to have done so if they were going 
to make a saving, and the survey results were therefore unlikely to include data for customers for whom a 
switch would result in either no saving at all or only a small saving.”  




“We considered the ad went beyond highlighting the disparity Virgin believed existed between advertised 
broadband speeds compared to those that were delivered and that it implied other ISPs dealt with 
consumers dishonestly in relation to broadband speeds.”  




“… we considered that the legibility of the small print was poor and consumers were unlikely to be able 
easily to read the qualifying criteria. We understood from the small print that broadband was only available 
at £6.49 if the customer lived in one of PlusNet's "low cost areas" and that the price was £12.99 from month 
four otherwise.” 
Misleading advertising, Qualifications. 
Orange  
(105158) 
“…we considered that the claim "The Orange 3G network covers more people in the UK than any other 
operator" was ambiguous in the context of a mobile broadband service because it did not make clear 
whether it was referring to Orange covering more people in the places where they lived than any other 
operator (population coverage), or more people in the UK, wherever they might be using their 3G mobile 
device (geographical coverage).” 
Substantiation, Truthfulness, Other comparisons. 
Motorola  
(161483) 
“…while we acknowledged the ad showed the phone being used with other associated accessories, we 
considered viewers would understand the claim ‘The world's most powerful smartphone’, along with a 
close-up of the phone, to mean the phone, in isolation, was the most powerful smartphone.” 
Misleading advertising, Substantiation, Exaggeration, Comparisons. 
   
Sections 52 and 53 of the Communications Act give OFCOM the power to impose on operators and 
service providers procedures for resolving consumer complaints and disputes through the terms of 
the general authorization. This is to be carried out by means of codes of conduct which OFCOM has to 
approve – typically groups of providers adopt a shared code and implementation scheme. The CEO of 
OFCOM has suggested that too few people know about such schemes – an unsung success story – and 
that it took too long to invoke its procedures.95 
OTELO is the Office of the Telecommunications Ombudsman, its function is to “sort out 
disagreements between public communications providers and their customers” as a free and 
independent service, investigating complaints by listening to both sides of the story. It is approved by, 
but not controlled by OFCOM, as one means for customers to exercise their right under the 
Communications Act to obtain independent dispute resolution.  
OTELO receives an average of 6,000 telephone calls and 2,000 letters per month. Many of these do not 
result in cases, but some 450 cases are closed in an average month usually within six weeks. 
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The Communications & Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CISAS) is also approved by OFCOM 
for individuals and small businesses to settle disputes with service providers.96  It is primarily for 
members of the Internet Services Providers Association (ISPA) and Internet Telephony Services 
Providers Association (ITSPA). It is run by IDRS Ltd as a “free” service, with the costs being covered 
by the members. The scale of the applications made to CISAS is around two hundred per month, 
though many of these are outside the scope of the scheme. 
Phonepay Plus, formerly the Independent Committee for the Supervision of Standards of Telephone 
Information Services (ICSTIS), is the body that regulates premium rate phone services through a code 
of practice for service providers.97 Under OFTEL and continued under OFCOM, an obligation was 
imposed on certain classes of providers of premium services to join ICSTIS as a form of mandatory 
self-regulation with a code of conduct approved by OFCOM.  
In December 2007, following a consultation, OFCOM brought Phonepay Plus under much tighter 
control in order to avoid surprises.98  It appointed a senior official for liaison who attends board 
meetings of Phonepay Plus and created a reserve power allowing it to issue directions. With 
immediate effect, Phonepay Plus became a delegated agency. 
Phonepay Plus is a member of the International Audiotex Regulators Network (IARN), a body which 
ICSTIS helped to create.99 A growing number of complaints arise from international premium rate 
calls, with each European country having created its own system to address fraud and abuse.100 
The Office of the Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA) is independent of both OFCOM and the 
operators.101It was originally established to facilitate wholesale access for competitors to BT’s local 
loops.  The system was reformulated as OTA2 following the introduction of the Openreach agreement 
to cover: 
  Unbundled local loops (including backhaul); 
  Wholesale Line Rental (WLR); 
  Carrier Pre-Selection (CPS); and  
  Geographic number portability. 
The function of OTA2 is to ensure swift implementation of processes, providing seamless migration 
between services for end users.  It enables all service providers and thus end users to benefit by 
mediating problems so that issues can be resolved before they become formal disputes. At one time 
BT Openreach published forty indicators for OTA2 each week. 
Perhaps surprisingly, BT Openreach also conducts consultations of its stakeholders, or at least 
customers.  It sought views on the provision for “naked DSL” before concluding that there was 
insufficient demand to justify the development and launch of such a service.102  
The same person serves as Executive Chairman of both OTA2 and of Next Generation Network UK 
(NGNuk).103 NGNuk arose from a policy adopted by OFCOM in early 2006, following a consultation, 
which identified a number of areas requiring collaboration amongst operators.104 Its mission is: 
… to act as a co-ordination forum in which key investors in NGN infrastructure and 
services will discuss, research, consider and, where possible, agree the direction for 
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NGNs in the UK and communicate such direction to other players in the 
telecommunications industry and the general public. 
It is to set guiding principles, a vision and an implementation framework for future interconnection. 
In doing so it: 
… has a two way relationship with other industry bodies, such as Consult 21 and the 
NICC taking input to enable its commercial work to succeed and providing policy output 
to enable them to undertake their functions. 
The Network Interoperabiltity Consultative Committee (NICC) is a forum in which operators, service 
providers, manufacturers and regulators can reach technical arrangements for interconnection and 
interoperability.105  Whereas, Consult 21 is a process created by BT to address access issues on “21CN”, 
the brand name for its NGN. 106 
The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) is well respected partnership or hybrid organization with the 
objectives of fostering trust and confidence in the Internet among current and future fixed and mobile 
users.107 The IWF provides a hotline for the public to report potentially illegal images of child sexual 
abuse hosted anywhere in the world and content that is criminally obscene or is an incitement to racial 
hatred hosted in the UK. It operates a notice and take-down service for such materials with UK service 
providers.  
The IWF is registered under the Charities Act 2006 and is governed by a Board of Trustees, 
comprising an Independent Chair, six non-industry representatives and three industry representatives. 
It is funded primarily by voluntary contributions. It is a “relevant authority” in terms of a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the Association of 
Chief Police Officers (ACPO) in terms of Section 46 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
In its consultation about its strategy for 2008-10 the IWF identified a need “to move on”, building on 
its success. The proposals included a research and policy development role, possible changes to the 
categories of materials covered and overseas work to promote its successful model.  
The Gambling Commission is an independent regulator created by the Gambling Act, 2005.108 Its aims 
are to keep crime out of gambling, to ensure that gambling is conducted fairly and openly and to 
protect children and other vulnerable people from being harmed or exploited by gambling. It also 
provides advice to HMG. In particular, the Gambling Commission regulates Internet gambling and 
thus is involved in contentious cross-border issues including the provision of services to players in 
countries where gambling may be forbidden. 
The Information Commissioner is an independent official who is responsible for implementation of 
the:109 
  Data Protection Act 1998; 
  Freedom of Information Act 2000; 
  Environmental Information Regulations, 2004, S.I. 2004/3391; and  
  Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations, 2003, S.I. 2003/2426. 
The Information Commissioner is a member of the Article 29 Working Group, which comprises the 
various national data protection authorities in the European Union.110 
The array of often obscure offices and schemes created to support and to supplement the work of 
DCMS and OFCOM is complex to a point where few can or do understand it. While initiatives to 
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improve specific aspects of the operation of the market and of regulation are generally to be 
commended, when they reach a point that even those working in the sector are uncertain of the 
various roles, then transparency has been lost. In different capacities OFCOM is responsible for 
oversight of many of these bodies, with the Home Office being responsible for the others, and in 
theory being held accountable to Parliament. There are no estimates available for the total costs or the 
benefits delivered by these organizations.  
XI.  Conclusion 
The United Kingdom likes to present itself as a leader in telecommunications regulatory innovation 
and deregulation. Yet, its performance in terms of competitiveness and outputs – the services 
delivered to its businesses and citizens – is not significantly better than would be expected for an 
economy of its size and strength, indeed in some areas it is poorer. Other than in the assessment by 
ECTA, where it is now second to the Netherlands, the UK scores only moderately well. In particular, 
neither HMG nor OFCOM has produced indicators that would measure how British efforts at 
deregulation compare with rival economies, such as Germany, Japan or the USA. 
The question of whether other countries follow a British lead is complex. OFCOM claims some success 
is promoting functional separation and spectrum trading, but neither of these is exclusively British, 
nor have they been demonstrated to have delivered significant benefits, even at home. In particular, 
the BT Openreach undertakings, although novel, are not an unqualified success with a very difficult 
transition from copper to fibre access networks. The legal basis and the enormous complexity of the 
whole scheme make its replicability difficult to achieve and the results inevitably different. 
The UK regulatory system is one of mind-numbing complexity and somewhat Heath-Robinson 
construction. It is very doubtful that politicians and senior officials fully understand how it operates, 
with the effects of any changes being almost impossible to evaluate. While HMG talks of Joined-Up 
Government (JUG), it is not supposed to mean that everything is interlinked with such complexity 
that it avoids responsibility or blame ever being attributed.  
There is a clear and present democratic deficit. As the House of Lords has conceded, greater oversight 
by Parliament is required, to hold ministers, OFCOM and the various other subsidiary regulators to 
account. Such oversight is not practicable in the short term, it would first require considerable 
streamlining and simplification. It is made more complex by the growing powers of the devolved 
administrations and assemblies, which must be included.  
OFCOM is sometimes called the “the regulator” yet it is neither, being merely one, admittedly the 
leader, of a pack of regulators, while its scope has extended well into the arena of policy. Much of the 
activity of OFCOM is hidden in plain sight amongst the several thousands of pages of highly complex 
documents it produces each year and which very few people ever read or would have reason to read. 
In the mid-2000s, cabinet ministers lost control of telecommunications policy. The technocrats at 
OFCOM had, through their “regulatory strategy” and innumerable consultation documents, set 
themselves up as a policy-maker. HMG gave only vague and general directions that OFCOM was left 
to interpret with the stakeholders – in reality a handful of the largest operators. The Cameron 
Administration appears to have begun bringing this back under ministerial control. 
The UK is rightly used as an example of the “regulatory state” and there are certainly a goodly 
number of regulators. However, it could equally well be called a “consultative state” with its 
emphasis on formal and informal discussions with stakeholders, but while these are nominally open 
to the public they are not of the public. Citizens have little interest in such arcane subjects and, insofar 
as they are aware of them, assume parliament and government oversee them.  
There is considerable scope for research, from governance to technical issues. At a generic level it 
could examine the evolution of the regulatory state, identifying techniques and measures that might 
be used to evaluate its performance. The question of the accountability of delegated or quasi-ITS EUROPE 2011 SUTHERLAND U NITED KINGDOM 
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autonomous agencies could be reviewed. It would be useful to build detailed models that would 
allow possible reforms to be tested before being applied.  
Competition is stressed by HMG and OFCOM, but it needs to be measured and those measures tested 
(e.g., to explain the profusion of not-spots for fixed and mobile broadband, despite the supposed 
regulatory and competitive incentives to build networks). Government continues to view deregulation 
as beneficial, an hypothesis that ought to be tested, though it would first be necessary to devise 
measures of deregulation. The costs of the telecommunications regulatory state have never been 
calculated, so that an audit of the burden for customers should be undertaken. The question of 
leadership might be addressed in terms of diffusion of innovation, building models of how ideas and 
practices have spread.111 
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